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Abstract:  
The Basel Committee plans to differentiate risk-adjusted capital requirements between banks 
regulated under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach and banks under the standard 
approach. We investigate the consequences for the lending capacity and the failure risk of 
banks in a model with endogenous interest rates. The optimal regulatory response depends on 
the banks’ inclination to increase their portfolio risk. If IRB-banks are well-capitalized or gain 
little from taking risks, then they will increase their market share and hold safe portfolios. As 
risk-taking incentives become more important, the optimal portfolio size of banks adopting 
intern rating systems will be increasingly constrained, and ultimately they may lose market 
share relative to banks using the standard approach. The regulator has only limited options to 
avoid the excessive adoption of internal rating systems. 
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Motivation. The new Basel II Accord scheduled for implementation after 2006 will have a
substantial and lasting impact on the structure of the banking industry. The capital adequacy
guidelines proposed by the Basel Committee1 are intended to tailor the minimum capital require-
m e n t sm o r ea c c u r a t e l yt ot h et r u ec r e d i tr i s ka ﬀorded by each individual bank loan or other
asset. This objective is to be achieved by a two-pronged reform: ﬁrst, a more precise diﬀerenti-
ation among credit risks; second, by introducing a dual approach of distinguishing between the
Standard Approach (SA) and the Internal Ratings Based Approach (IRB).
Under the SA regulation, certiﬁed credit rating agencies will assign risk coeﬃcients to bank
loans and other bank assets, and for commercial bank loans without an external rating, the
risk weight will be assumed to be 100%. By contrast, under the IRB regulation, banks will
be authorized to undertake the risk classiﬁcation of assets themselves according to their own
credit scoring models. The Basel Committee plans to set a high regulatory standard for banks
operating under the IRB approach, but wants to increase the attractiveness of investing into the
IRB approval process. Therefore, the Committee has announced that it will oﬀer a reduction of
2-3% in the required capital, compared with the capital needed for the same risk-weighted asset
portfolio under SA.
A consequence of the Basel Accord is that by advocating IRB, the power to determine the
minimum capital requirements for individual bank assets is eﬀectively delegated to the banks
themselves. The idea is to beneﬁt from the banks’ vastly improving expertise in rating the credit
risk of their assets, and to avoid the duplication of credit evaluation eﬀorts that the banks needs
to undertake anyway. But delegating regulatory decisions to the regulated entity raises genuine
concerns about possible agency conﬂicts. Banks can use their rating power to manipulate their
risk assessments in order to reduce their overall required capital. Thus, the ﬁrst objective of
our paper is to address the newly emerging agency problems between regulator and banks using
IRB. We consider three moral hazard problems and their possible interaction: banks’ risk-taking,
banks’ misreporting of their portfolio risk, and banks’ excessive adoption of unregulated advanced
1See Basel Committee (2004). The proposal povides for three distinct pillars of banking regulation, (i) standards
for capital adequacy, (ii) banking supervision and (iii) market discipline. In this paper, we will exclusively focus
on the most prominent of these pillars, the one on capital adequacy. While the pillars are probably regulatory
substitutes to some extent (this has been pointed out e.g. by Acharya, 2003, Decamps, Rochet and Roger, 2004 or
Morrison and White, 2004), our perspective is the optimal design of the capital adequacy pillar, once the optimal
weight for each of the three pillars is determined.
1scoring systems.2
The dual approach of oﬀering two diﬀerent regulatory standards is likely to profoundly aﬀect
the capacity to make informed lending decisions, the level of competition and interest rates, the
charter value and the failure risk of banks. An appropriate investigation of these questions requires
a model that allows to analyze the general equilibrium consequences within the entire banking
sector. The proposed Basel II Accord has so far only been studied with respect to a single bank
or in a partial equilibrium framework, i.e. for a given market structure of the banking sector.
The second objective of our paper is thus to analyze how an optimal implementation of the Basel
II dual approach will aﬀect the market shares of banks operating under IRB relative to banks
operating under SA. We are not aware of a previous formal analysis linking these two issues, bank
moral hazard and the evolving bank market structure under Basel II.
The Basel Committee’s stated intention is that Basel II will lead banks to make improvements
in their internal rating capabilities. These improvements are costly, and so a third objective of
our paper is to link an analysis of the market structure under Basel II to the incentives to invest
in internal rating systems.
Analysis and Results. We consider the simplest possible model for our purposes, an economy
with two banks and two types of projects. Safe projects feature a higher expected return and
lower risk than risky projects. Initially, neither banks nor rating agencies or the regulator can
discriminate between safe and risky projects. One of the banks, however, has the option to invest
in an improvement of its credit scoring system and will then be able to screen between safe and
risky projects. With this investment, the bank qualiﬁes to use the IRB approach.
Our analysis initially shows that the optimal regulatory response is to assign lower risk-
adjusted capital requirements to the IRB-bank compared with the SA-bank, thus conﬁrming
the stated intention of the Basel Committee. The reason is that there are economies of scale
in absorbing risks. As long as the IRB-bank will select a predominantly safe loan portfolio, the
regulator will assign low capital requirements to the IRB-bank that, as the relatively safer bank,
should grow in order to provide protection against bank failure risks for a larger part of the econ-
2Within the IRB-approach, the Basel Committee distinguishes between a foundation approach and an advanced
approach. Under the foundation approach, the IRB-banks’ own assessment is restricted to the probability of
default (PD), whereas advanced IRB-banks use their own systems also to estimate the loss given default (LGD)
and the exposure at default (EAD) (see Basel Committee (2004), Part 2, III). Though interesting, this distinction
is neglected in our model as expected social bankruptcy costs depend only on which projects are funded.
2omy. Thus, there is a beneﬁcial diﬀerentiation eﬀect concerning both the size and the risk of
the two banks’ loan portfolios, as heterogeneity in banks’ leverage ratios and risk levels increases
overall welfare. As a result, the regulator will discriminate in favor of the bank with the better
portfolio quality, i.e. the IRB-bank if it prefers safe projects. The IRB-bank’s market share
increases, and the market share of the SA-bank decreases. This result provides a rationale for
keeping large banks safe - or in fact, for allowing safe banks to become large.
A second beneﬁcial consequence of the diﬀerentiation among banks is a decline in the level of
bank competition due to an interest rate eﬀect. As long as the IRB-bank uses its superior screening
capabilities to select more safe projects, the interest rates determined by the possible market entry
of SA-banks, will increase and the IRB-bank will garner additional rents. The associated increase
in banks’ proﬁt means that the failure risk is reduced. The banking literature has discussed
the beneﬁcial impact of reduced competition on bank stability. Our analysis contributes to this
strand of literature with the insight that only IRB-banks will beneﬁt from higher proﬁts and more
stability, while there is no positive eﬀect for SA-banks.
The selection of a safer loan portfolio by the IRB-bank negatively aﬀects the loan quality of
projects available for SA-banks, which is not only the reason why interest rates increase, but also
means an increased failure risk for SA-banks. Our paper sheds light on this important eﬀect of
the Basel II regulation: by improving the screening capabilities of banks using internal scoring
systems and giving them incentives to choose low-risk projects, the new system inﬂicts damage
on the asset quality of the remaining banks. Since the SA-banks will inevitably be among the
smallest and weakest banks in a ﬁnancial system, this general equilibrium eﬀect will further add
to their fragility. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that the welfare under the dual approach is higher than
if all banks are SA-regulated, due to the competition eﬀe c ta n dt h es i z ea n dr i s kd i ﬀerentiation
eﬀect.
Up to this point, our analysis has not yet taken into account that IRB-banks might be in-
clined to increase the riskiness of their assets, by exploiting their informational advantage and
misreporting their true risk levels so as to beneﬁt from lower capital requirements. To explore this
important agency problem, our model makes the extreme assumption that IRB-banks have full
discretion to misrepresent the actual riskiness of their assets without having to fear any penalties
or consequences. IRB-bank might then tend to aggressively adopt and misreport risky projects
due to a simple risk-shifting eﬀect or limited liability eﬀect well-known from the bank regulation
literature. The initial equity endowment of banks and the diﬀerence in returns between safe and
risky projects determines the relative attractiveness of risk-taking.
3We ﬁnd that, as risk-taking incentives increase, the regulator will raise the capital requirements
for IRB-banks to ensure that their portfolios remain safe. Gradually, the size diﬀerentiation eﬀect
of the dual approach under the Basel II Accord will be lost, and Basel I may be socially superior
if equity endowments are relatively high, as a uniform regulation provides then for a better
risk allocation across banks. When risk-taking incentives are very high, then the regulator will
optimally limit the IRB-bank’s lending so much that it will face higher capital adequacy ratios
than the SA-bank, and experience a drop in its market share after investing in an internal rating
system. If risk-taking incentives are even higher, the optimal policy may again be reversed: the
regulator may then ﬁnd it optimal to let the IRB-banks absorb a large portion of risky assets in
order to balance the overall risk allocation.
In the ﬁnal step of our analysis, we consider the investment outlays necessary to meet the
IRB-standards. We show that the incentives of banks to invest into their IRS capabilities will
usually not coincide with the optimum for the regulator. The reason for these suboptimal invest-
ment incentives are twofold: ﬁrst, the banks’ equityholders will not consider the social cost of
their failure. Second, their gains from bank diﬀerentiation may exceed the social beneﬁts since
shareholders take only the positive eﬀects into account, while ignoring the declining size and de-
teriorating loan portfolio of the other banks in the industry. Compared with the socially optimal
investment level, banks are likely to overinvest into their internal rating systems if the social costs
of bank failure are low, and to underinvest if social costs are high. We assume (realistically) that
banks have discretion to improve their internal rating capabilities while continuing to be regulated
under the standard approach.
We show that the regulator’s best choice of instrument, in order to correct these investment
ineﬃciencies, are lump-sum transfers, and not penalties or discounts on the capital adequacy
ratios. The reason is that the regulator pursues the double objective of providing optimal in-
vestment incentives and ensuring an optimal portfolio allocation across banks, and she needs two
separate policy instruments (transfers and capital adequacy ratios) to avoid conﬂicts between
both objectives. We ﬁnd that the regulator will normally be able to correct underinvestment
incentives, but is relatively powerless when faced with banks that invest too aggressively into
their IRS capabilities. This problem is aggravated by the banks’ discretion to invest into IRS
capabilities without formally operating under the IRB approach. The best the regulator can do
is then to accommodate the banks’ excessive adoption of IRS capabilities, and in some cases even
to oﬀer subsidies to banks to entice cooperation with the IRB regulation.
Thus, we conclude that a success of Basel II, in terms of banks massively and early embracing
4the IRB approach, should not be mistaken as a sign that this is an eﬃcient arrangement. It may
simply be indicative of a situation where banks improve their rating capabilities to take advan-
tage of risk-shifting opportunities, and where accommodation is the best option for a relatively
powerless regulator.
Relation to the Literature. Our paper is related to the vast literature on bank capital and its
optimal regulation and more speciﬁcally, to the numerous papers on risk-taking by banks and the
regulation of bank capital (see Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor, 1998, Santos, 2001, and Allen,
2004, for surveys). Acharya (2001) endogenizes the choice of systemic risk in a bank loan portfolio
and discusses the regulatory consequences. Tighter capital requirements have been argued to
increase risk-taking incentives (Thakor, 1996), Besanko and Kanatas, 1996), to reduce them
(Repullo, 2000), or to have mixed eﬀects (Calem and Rob, 1999). In respect to the competition
eﬀect, Matutes and Vives (1996) show that reduced banking competition mitigates risk-taking
incentives. Hellmann, Murdock and Stiglitz (2000) also emphasize negative eﬀects of strong
competition and discuss the impact of monitoring. Morrison and White (2004) point out that
the impact of capital adequacy ratios on risk taking may depend on the regulator’s monitoring
competence. Boot and Greenbaum (1993) argue that excessive risk taking can be mitigated by
reputation eﬀects. Since the beneﬁt of reputation decreases in the degree of competition, imperfect
competition may be welfare-improving.
There is also a literature analyzing the banks’ incentives to understate their portfolio risk
when using internal ratings. Similar to Morrison and White (2004), Marshall and Venkatamaran
(1999) and Dangl and Lehar (2002) argue that the beneﬁt from internal rating depends on the
regulator’s monitoring quality and punishment potential. Gersbach and Wehrspohn (2001) argue
that banks will underinvest in their scoring models because they will identify bad loans more
often, which leads to higher capital adequacy ratios with internal rating, but they do not consider
that credit risks may be opportunistically misstated.
The paper closest in spirit is Repullo and Suarez (2003) who model a competitive banking
sector where borrowers choose between IRB-banks and SA-banks. In their paper, IRB-banks will
always specialize in riskier, and the average interest rate after Basel II decreases. In our model,
both cherry picking and risk-shifting is possible, and the interest rate increases if IRB-banks
prefer cherry picking, so that our conclusions are strikingly diﬀerent from their. The reason is
that, contrary to our analysis, they do not consider bank moral hazard and do not choose capital
requirements to maximize social welfare, since their focus is on simulating the general equilibrium
5eﬀects of Basel II.
Empirical literature on potential impacts of the Basel II Accord has focused on the likely
procyclical eﬀects. Altman and Saunders (2001) demonstrate that external ratings and hence the
SA component of Basel II would be likely to be procyclical, employing simulations for the US
recession 1989-91. Montfort and Mulder (2000) and Peura and Lokivuolle (2004) ﬁnd the same
procyclical eﬀect for internal rating systems. Calibrating data from American banks, Furﬁne
(2001) predicts that Basel II would lead to fewer risky loans, but also to more lending overall and
a lower portfolio weight of riskfree bonds, making the overall eﬀect on the portfolio risk ambiguous.
Another strand of the literature has investigated the consistency of internal and external ratings
to predict default risks, for example Carey (2001), Gropp and Richards (2001) and Claessens and
Embrechts (2003).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. In Section 3, we derive the
banks’ proﬁts and social welfare in case of two SA-banks. Section 4 analyzes the case where Bank
A has invested and prefers safe projects to risky (and low-return) projects. Section 5 introduces
Bank A’s portfolio choice, which turns out to be a problem of risk-shifting, and presents an
analysis of the interaction between regulator’s and bank’s decision-making. Section 6 discusses
robustness issues and concludes.
2. The Model
Banks and Projects. Our model consists of two banks, Bank A and Bank B. Initially, both
banks have rating systems of low quality. However, Bank A can invest C ≥ 0 into improving its
rating system. If C is invested, Bank A acquires an internal rating system (IRS) that is suﬃcient
to qualify for the use of internal ratings (IRB) under the Basel II Accord.3 If Bank A invests C,
it has the option to submit its IRS to the regulator, who can verify the quality of the IRS and will
grant approval to Bank A to operate as an IRB-bank. Note that, for simplicity, only Bank A has
an option to invest and to become an IRB-bank. The investment in an IRS is really a technical
decision to upgrade the bank’s information system, and the bank could undertake this investment
independently of the regulatory environment. We therefore assume that Bank A can also choose
to invest in an IRS, at a cost of C, without requesting to be regulated as an IRB-bank. A bank
(Bank A or Bank B) that uses the standard approach is called a SA-bank. We call the regulation
3The argument would not change if we assumed instead that the investment is only successful with some prob-
ability q(C).
6of the banking sector “Basel I” if both banks are uniformly regulated as SA-banks, and refer to
the regulation as “Basel II” if Bank A becomes an IRB-bank. Banks are risk neutral and have
identical equity endowments of E.
The economy consists of a continuum of projects with a total measure of one. Any portfolio
with positive measure consists of an inﬁnity of projects. All projects require an identical invest-
ment outlay that we normalize to a unit of investment, i.e. funds worth n are needed to ﬁnance a
portfolio of measure n ≤ 1. The return (rate of return plus one) of each project is X if it succeeds,
and zero if it fails. X is the project’s total return, which is diﬀerent from the (endogenous) return
to the bank, R, which is principal and interest. Distinguishing between total (social) return and
the bank’s (private) return is an essential ingredient of our analysis, since we want to conduct a
comprehensive analysis of the investment incentives in internal rating systems.
We assume that 1
2 of the projects are “safe”, and 1
2 of them are “risky”. Safe projects yield X
with probability k ≥ 1
2, and nothing with probability 1 − k. The realizations of safe projects are
uncorrelated, meaning that the return of any measurable portfolio of safe projects will be exactly
kX. Risky projects do not only yield a lower average return, but they are also strongly correlated.
To capture this in a simple way, we assume that a portfolio of measure n of risky projects yields
tnX,w h e r et ∈ [0,1] is a uniformly distributed random variable. Thus, the random variable t
indicates the realization of the systematic risk in the loan portfolio. Since the expectation of t
is 0.5, the average return of a risky project is 1
2X ≤ kX. We come back to the assumption that
k ≥ 1
2 in Section 6.
With respect to the information structure, we assume that the type of project is unobservable
to SA-banks, to external rating agencies, and to the regulator. By contrast, if Bank A becomes an
IRB-bank, it can perfectly discriminate between safe and risky projects. As to external ratings,
this expresses the idea that rating agencies provide less accurate signals about the credit risk than
sophisticated internal rating systems.4
Bank Failure. We assume X>2 so that ﬁnancing even risky projects would be socially
worthwhile if there were no bankruptcy risk. If there is a bankruptcy event for one of the two
banks, this is assumed to involve a real cost for society, the loss of the social charter value Z of
the bank. Primarily, this social cost Z of bank failure consists in the disruption of the ﬁnancing
and payment ﬂows for the bank’s customers (borrowers and lenders), a disruption that will show
4This idea seems to be widely shared by industry practitioners. It is also implied by the literature emphasizing
the uniqueness of bank loans, following James (1987).
7some persistence if the customers have privileged relationships with the failed bank. This type
of social costs of a bank failure is roughly proportional to the size of bank’s assets, and thus we
assume that the social loss of a bank failure is nz. We denote the expected bankruptcy loss by
Z = Prob(bankruptcy)·nz. Notice that even if there were additional contagion eﬀects (we ignore
these in our model), for example if customers of a failed bank were to trigger the insolvency of
other projects in the economy, then in an economy of homogeneous projects, with a homogeneous
degree of interﬁrm credit and payment linkages, the total eﬀect of all direct and indirect eﬀects
would again be proportional to the loan portfolio size of the initially failed bank.
Ratings, Capital Adequacy Ratios and Regulation. The regulator’s instruments in our
model are capital adequacy ratios b, which depend on the type of bank regulation (SA-bank or
IRB-bank), and the riskiness of the loan, i.e. the declared quality of the project it ﬁnances. For
projects ﬁnanced by a SA-bank, external ratings will be consulted in accordance with the proce-
dures under the proposed Basel II Accord. Since regulator and bank have the same information on
loan selection, the eﬀect of external rating is that for an SA-bank, all projects will be considered
as being unidentiﬁed, and hence assumed to be safe or risky with the exact probabilities which
the bank expects to draw them.
By contrast, we assume that an IRB-bank can opportunistically misrepresent the types of the
projects it ﬁnances, and the regulator has no monitoring or disciplining capabilities to prevent it
from doing so. As we will see, this has an inﬂuence on the optimal choice of capital adequacy
ratios. While this is certainly an extreme assumption, we employ it to capture one of the essential
agency conﬂicts of internal rating systems: banks will always have better knowledge and control
of their IRS than regulators, and they are likely to use this informational asymmetry to their
advantage. Any imperfect monitoring technology that the regulator possesses to evaluate the
outcome of the internal ratings process would weaken, but not abolish this agency conﬂict.5
The regulator can use other incentives devices, besides capital adequacy ratios b, to induce
Bank A to make an optimal investment decision. We consider lump-sum transfers that are paid
to Bank A if it obtains regulatory approval to operate as IRB-bank. This transfer could be
positive (a subsidy to the bank) or negative (a tax) and is denoted by s. The regulator has
no power to impose transfers on SA-banks (assuming so would not be realistic), or to employ a
5Even if the regulator uses advanced statistical models to track the performance of the bank’s internal rating
system, manipulation will easily be possible at least in the short term: namely, manipulation-induced losses are
initially indistinguishable from bad luck in the portfolio return realization.
8command-control approach to determine the investment decision.
Equilibrium on the Loan Market. Let R be the interest factor (interest rate plus 1). We
assume that the interest rates in this economy are determined competitively, in the following sense:
the competitive interest rate is set such that any new potential market entrant that contemplates
entering the market as an SA-bank will make zero proﬁts on its ﬁrst project. This idea is akin
to the concept of a contestable market for loans. It does not exclude that at the same time
the two incumbent banks can make positive proﬁts, even when they are SA-regulated, namely
if their loan portfolios are large enough that they beneﬁt from the option value provided by a
positive bankruptcy probability (this is indeed what we will observe). The interest rate is then
endogenous: it depends in fact on the quality of the project that any entering bank expects to
pick up. To tie this down in a precise manner, we assume that Bank A ﬁrst picks its portfolio,
i.e. it screens all projects and retains only those projects that it wants to fund. This timing will
give a ﬁrst mover advantage to Bank A only if it has adopted an IRS and therefore is able to
observe the project types accurately. The quality of projects funded by Bank B (or any potential
market entrant) corresponds then to the average quality of projects in the remaining pool after
Bank A has made its choice. Therefore, with diﬀerentiated banks, the expected portfolio of any
market entrant depends on Bank A’s project choice, and therefore the interest rate depends on
the equilibrium belief on Bank A’s portfolio choice.6 The endogeneity of the interest rate is an
important aspect of our analysis.
Timing. The timing of the game is as follows:
Stage 1. The regulator makes a credible announcement on the conditions that govern the
subsequent investment decision. These conditions can be summarized by a subsidy/tax s for
Bank A if it gets approval as an IRB-bank.
Stage 2. Bank A chooses one of three options regarding investment C.F i r s t , B a n k A can
decide not to invest, in which case both banks are identical. Second, Bank A m a yi n v e s ti na n
IRS but hide its IRS capabilities from the regulator. Third, Bank A may invest and submit its
IRS to the regulator, who will then always recognize the bank as an IRB-bank. If Bank A does
not invest or does not submit, then the regulation of the banking sector will be uniform (as under
6For some parameters, multiple equilibrium beliefs may arise. In this case, we select the beliefs of a market
entrant (and hence R) that are consistent with the eﬃcient equilibrium, which is the equilibrium with the smallest
amount of risk-shifting.
9the Basel I Accord). If Bank A invests and obtains IRB-status, then the regulation of the banking
sector can be diﬀerentiated, as under the Basel II Accord.
Stage 3. The regulator announces the menu of capital adequacy ratios b.
Stage 4. Bank A makes its portfolio choice. If it has invested in an IRS, it has the opportunity
to screen all projects and to pick those that it wishes to fund. Then, Bank B makes its project
choice, and the interest factor R is determined such that a market entrant (SA-bank) expects to
make zero proﬁts. Since Bank A’s true portfolio choice is unobservable, R is determined by the
equilibrium belief on A’s choice.
Stage 5. Nature decides upon the success of projects. This also determines if a bank is
insolvent or not.
Figure 1 contains a game tree that summarizes all 5 stages of the game. We will solve for
the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game using backwards induction. Since stage 5 is
a chance move by Nature, we have to begin to work backwards in stage 4, where banks decide on
their portfolios.
3. Uniform Bank Regulation: Basel I Accord
We start with the case where Bank A has not invested in an IRS, so both banks possess the same
rating quality and will be regulated as SA-banks. So this case is in fact equivalent to the regulatory
situation under the Basel I Accord. For this case, we use the superscript u (for "uniform"), and
we will directly derive the banks’ optimal decisions given the capital adequacy ratio b (stage 4)
and the regulator’s optimal b (stage 3). The same will then be done under the assumption that
Bank A has invested in section 4. Under Basel I, both banks face the same capital adequacy ratio
bu
7 and the number of projects funded by each bank is nu ≤ E
bu. Applying backwards induction,
we ﬁrst analyze proﬁts and bankruptcy risks as a function of nu (stage 4), then turning to the
regulator’s choice of the optimal bu given that we have a uniform banking sector (stage 3).
We assume that equity E is insuﬃcient to allow for all projects to be ﬁnanced without that
banks would ever incur a risk of insolvency. This uninteresting case is excluded if E ≤ 1
2(1+2k),
which we will assume throughout the paper. Since banks cannot discriminate between safe and
risky projects, each loan portfolio consists of nu
2 safe and nu
2 risky projects. For given nu and E,
the bank will avoid insolvency if the realization of the systematic shock t is large enough such
7We assume that the regulator cannot discriminate between two identical banks, for example because of legality
concerns. Such a discrimination would be attractive in our model as we will see later on.
10that the bank’s assets are at least equal to its liabilities, or if
nu
2
kR+
nu
2
tR + E − nu ≥ 0. (3.1)
Let ˜ tu ≥ 0 denote the minimum value of t ≥ 0 satisfying (3.1). Because t is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval, ˜ tu conveniently embodies also the bankruptcy probability. The
expected proﬁt per bank can then be expressed as:
Πu =( 1− ˜ tu)
³nu
2
kR +
nu
2
E
£
t |t>˜ tu
¤
R + E − nu
´
, (3.2)
where R is the (endogenously determined) interest factor. If the bank avoids insolvency,
which it does with probability 1−˜ tu, then the return from safe projects is kR with certainty, and
the expected return from risky projects is E
£
t |t>˜ tu
¤
R = 1+˜ tu
2 R. The latter depends on the
conditional expectation of t ≥ ˜ tu. Furthermore, the bank owns E and invests nu, explaining the
remaining terms in Eq. (3.2).
Recall that we determine R by assuming that a marginal project expected by a SA-bank
breaks even. Since the marginal project is an unidentiﬁed one in case of uniform banks, it is safe
o rr i s k yw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y0.5 each. Hence, we have 0.5 · kR +0 .5 · 0.5 · R =1 ,o rR = 4
(1+2k).
Substituting for R and rearranging Eq. (3.2) yields
Πu =( 1− ˜ tu)
µ
2k
(1 + 2k)
nu +
1+˜ tu
2
nu
2(1+2k)
+ E − nu
¶
. (3.3)
The insolvency threshold ˜ tu is reached when the return to the bank, including its capital
reserves E, is not enough to cover the deposits8 of investors worth nu,i . e .i f
˜ tu =m a x
µ
nu − E(1 + 2k)
2nu
,0
¶
. (3.4)
Substituting into the bank’s proﬁt function (3.3) and rearranging yields
Πu =
[2nu +2 E(1 + 2k)]
2
16nu (1 + 2k)
. (3.5)
Note that Πu is strictly increasing in nu, because the bank does not have to pay for the losses
if it becomes bankrupt due to a low realization of t. Hence, SA-banks fund as many projects as
possible, meaning that nu = E
bu.T h et o t a ls o c i a lw e l f a r ei s :
8The depositors are paid the risk-free interest rate of 0. Thus, we implicitly assume that there is a deposit
i n s u r a n c es c h e m ei np l a c et h a te ﬀectively covers all credit risk for the depositors. We also assume that the pricing
of the deposit insurance does not depend on its current loan portfolio decision. Therefore, the bank’s payment for
deposit insurance premia can be ignored.
11Wu =
1
4
(1 + 2k)2nuX +2 E − 2nu − 2
∙
nu − E(1 + 2k)
2nu
¸
nuz (3.6)
=
1
2
(1 + 2k)nuX +2 E − 2nu − [nu − E(1 + 2k)]z.
Here, 1
4(1 + 2k)X is the expected return of an unidentiﬁed project which enters the social
welfare regardless of the division of the return between project owners9 and banks, since all
players are assumed risk-neutral. Total equity of the two banks is 2E, and the projects require
investment outlays of 2nu. Finally, each banks goes bankrupt with probability
nu−E(1+2k)
2nu ,a n d
then causes costs of znu. Eq. (3.6) leads to
Proposition 1. If the project return X satisﬁes X ≥ 2
1+2k (z +2 ) , then the regulator will choose
bu =2 E and all projects will receive ﬁnancing (nu = 1
2). Bank failure will occur with positive
probability. Otherwise, the regulator will choose bu = 1
1+2k, each bank will ﬁnance less than half
of the available projects, nu = E(1 + 2k) < 1
2, and banks will never fail.
Proof. See Appendix.
The interesting point in Proposition 1 is that the regulator will either allow to fund all projects
or will avoid any bankruptcy risk at all. The intuition for this corner solution result is that
marginal expected bankruptcy costs (with respect to nu)a r ee q u a lt oz
2, and thus independent of
nu. Since the expected marginal social beneﬁt from a risky project is also constant and given by
X
2 −1 > 0, there is no interior solution. The condition stated in the Proposition that distinguishes
between both cases, X ≥ 2
1+2k (2 + z), simply says that the expected social beneﬁt of an additional
project, exceeds its total costs including the additional bankruptcy risk.
We encounter here already a property that will play a prominent role in our further analysis:
the fact that the marginal bankruptcy probability is decreasing in the number of projects implies
that social welfare could be increased by an asymmetric split between the two banks. As long as
banks are identical, however, such a discrimination is excluded by the legality principle.
Clearly, the critical threshold for X where the regulator does no longer want all projects to
be funded, depends also on z and k since the regulator’s incentive to allow for all projects is
9It does not make any diﬀerence whether project owner’s can fully extract X−R or whether part of this diﬀerence
goes to consumers.
12increasing in the expected return and decreasing in bankruptcy costs. In general, the parameter
regions where the regulator allows for all projects are diﬀerent in the cases with uniform and
diﬀerentiated banking sectors. Discussing all possible situations leads to tedious and economically
non-essential case distinctions, that would be further complicated by the fact that the parameters
z and k are also important to determine various cases of risk-shifting and investment incentives
and the regulatory response to them. To avoid these cases and to focus on the paper’s central
question whether internal rating is a good thing even in light of Bank A’s option to systematically
adopt risky projects, we introduce the following Assumption:
Assumption 1: The project return X is suﬃciently large so that the regulator always prefers
to have all projects funded.
As u ﬃcient condition for Assumption 1 to hold in all situations is that X ≥ 2+z,t h a ti s
if the expected return of a risky project exceeds the investment and bankruptcy loss even if the
bank is sure to fail. Even though the total lending volume is now independent of the regulator’s
decision and Bank A’s adoption of an IRS, the analysis is rich since the portfolio composition, the
optimal regulatory policy and the two banks’ failure probabilities still depend on these decisions
and how they interact. With Assumption 1, the only variables having an impact on total welfare
are (i) the cost of bank failure, which is the overall expected cost of bankruptcy for both banks
combined, and (ii) the investment costs if Bank A adopts an IRS. For future reference, we note
that then in the case of a uniformly regulated banking sector, the expected bankruptcy loss Zu
can be written as, using Eq. (4.10) and nu = 1
2:
Zu =
∙
1
2
− E(1 + 2k)
¸
z . (3.7)
4. Basel II Regulation
In this Section, we assume that Bank A has invested in an IRS and has been certiﬁed as an
IRB-bank. The analysis is more complex than before, because Bank A can now decide whether it
prefers to fund safe or risky projects, and because the regulator can diﬀerentiate between the two
banks. The decisions of the regulator and Bank A do in fact interact: Bank A’s portfolio choice
depends, among others, on the previous regulatory decision on the capital adequacy ratios b.A n d
there is an important feedback eﬀect since the regulator’s optimal capital adequacy regulation
depends on Bank A’s portfolio allocation.
13Therefore, we develop our analysis step-by-step: In Section 4.1, we ignore the risk-taking
problem by simply assuming that Bank A always chooses safe projects. We then solve the game
tree going backwards: in Section 4.2, we consider Bank A’s portfolio decision (Stage 5 in the
game tree), but do not yet endogenize the regulator’s optimal actions. We then account for the
regulator’s sequential decisions: in Section 4.3, we analyze the optimal choice of capital adequacy
ratios (Stage 4 of the game). Finally, in Section 4.4 we consider the case where Bank A has
decided to invest in an IRS, but did not apply for a license (Stage 3), before we turn in Section 5
to the regulator’s initial decision (Stage 1).10
4.1. Preference for Safe Projects
As explained above, we ﬁrst abstract from any risk-taking incentives for Bank A.I fB a n kA invests
and receives the status of an IRB-bank, then the regulator will in principle apply diﬀerent capital
adequacy ratios for safe and for risky projects, respectively. However, recall that an IRB-bank
can entirely misrepresent the appraisals supplied by its internal ratings system. In equilibrium, it
will use this discretion to its advantage. In our model, this means that it will be able to obtain the
lowest available b for every project it ﬁnances. Thus, the eﬀective capital requirement ratio for
an IRB-bank will be a uniform rate, bI: if the regulator applies diﬀerent ratio for safe and risky
projects, say bg for projects identiﬁed as safe and bb for projects identiﬁed as risky, then Bank
A will declare all of its loans as belonging to the category that is taxed less in terms of capital
requirements, and bI =m i n {bg,b b} will be the eﬀective rate. As a result, Bank A can ﬁnance
exactly nA = E
bI projects. Assuming that nA ≥ 1
2, the equilibrium proﬁts of Bank A are:11
ΠA
c =( 1− ˜ tA)
∙
1
2
kR + E
£
t|t>˜ tA¤
R
µ
nA −
1
2
¶
+ E − nA
¸
, (4.1)
where ˜ tA is the bankruptcy probability and nA is the number of projects in the loan portfolio
of Bank A. The equilibrium interest factor is R =2 ,s i n c eB a n kB will only fund risky projects.
Substituting for R yields:
ΠA
c =( 1− ˜ tA)
∙
k + E
£
t|t>˜ tA¤
2
µ
nA −
1
2
¶
+ E − nA
¸
. (4.2)
10Although it will turn out that this can never be a SPE, Bank A’s possibility to invest without applying for a
licence may inﬂuence the regulator’s optimal policy, and therefore needs to be taken into account.
11The bank proﬁt Π
A
c refers to the bank’s operating proﬁt neglecting investment costs C and subsidies s. Occa-
sionally, we wiil refer to the bank’s overall proﬁts as ˆ Π
A
c , i.e. ˆ Π
A
c = Π
A
c + s − C.
14The bankruptcy threshold of Bank A is again the smallest value of t where the square bracket
[.] in Eq. (4.2) is equal to zero, and this threshold value will be identical to the bankruptcy
probability ˜ tA:
˜ tA =m a x
½
nA − E − k
2nA − 1
,0
¾
. (4.3)
Bank B is allowed to fund 1−nA projects and, with an interest factor of R =2 , earns proﬁts
of:
ΠB
c =( 1− ˜ tB)
£¡
1 − nA¢
E
£
t|t>˜ tB¤
2+E −
¡
1 − nA¢¤
. (4.4)
Bank B’s bankruptcy threshold ˜ tB can be determined as, in analogy to Eq. (4.3):
˜ tB =m a x
½
1 − nA − E
2(1− nA)
,0
¾
. (4.5)
We denote the combined expected bankruptcy costs of both banks by Zc in the case where
Bank A invests, is regulated as an IRB-bank and prefers safe projects. This cost can be written
as
Zc
¡
nA¢
= nA˜ tAz +( 1− nA)˜ tBz , (4.6)
where ˜ tA and ˜ tB are as in Eq. (4.3) and (4.5). Minimizing Zc by choosing the optimal nA and
comparing it to the cost of bank failure Zu in the Basel I scenario given in expression (3.7), we
get the following result:
Proposition 2. Suppose there is no risk-shifting. Then, the regulator chooses b such that
nA = k + E, and Bank A faces no bankruptcy risk. Total expected bankruptcy costs are then
Zc(k + E)=1−2E−k
2 z<Z u =
£1
2 − E (1 + 2k)
¤
z.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 says that, if there is no risk-shifting under Basel II, it is optimal for the regulator
to avoid any risk of bank failure for the IRS-bank. The reason is that the regulator wants to shelter
as many projects as possible from bankruptcy risk. Of course, keeping Bank A safe means that the
bankruptcy risk of Bank B increases, but it will do so at a decreasing rate, since the bankruptcy
probability evolves as a concave function of portfolio size. Moreover, the failure risk in Bank B
will aﬀect the smaller loan portfolio.
15In eﬀect, two concurring eﬀects are on display here: ﬁrst, there is an economies of scale eﬀect
in the allocation of bankruptcy risk, making an unequal allocation of overall failure risk more
attractive from the regulator’s point of view than an equal one. When comparing the Basel II
and Basel I allocation, the combined bankruptcy loss of the banking sector is strictly lower under
the allocation of Proposition 2 than under Basel I. A similar eﬀect was in fact at work in our result
in Proposition 1 where we found that the regulator will either permit ﬁnancing of all projects, or
keep all banks safe. Second, there is a shelter eﬀect saying that the riskier bank should hold a
relatively small and the less risky bank a relatively large portfolio, to allocate the social cost of
any default event eﬃciently.
In a sense, the result of Proposition 2 provides a microeconomic rationale for a “too big to
fail” policy in banking regulation. We will later conﬁrm and reﬁne this intuition in more detail.
4.2. Risk-Shifting Incentives
In the former section, we have simply assumed that Bank A chooses safe projects ﬁrst. Now,
the bank’s project choice after having adopted an IRS is endogenized. When choosing its loan
portfolio, Bank A faces a trade-oﬀ between a quality eﬀect expressed by k>0.5,a n darisk-
shifting eﬀect, which captures the fact that risky projects oﬀer an attractive option to shift risks
from the bank’s shareholders to its depositors. If the bank is insolvent, shareholders are protected
from the downside loss by limited liability, but they fully enjoy the upside of a project’s payoﬀ.
Deﬁne α as the percentage of risky projects Bank A adopts, and 1 − α as the fraction of
safe projects. Analogously to the proﬁt functions explained in the case of two SA-banks, the
IRB-bank’s proﬁt function is then
ΠA =( 1− ˜ tA)
¡
(1 − α)kRnA + αE
£
t| t>˜ tA¤
RnA + E − nA¢
. (4.7)
Recall that the interest rate R depends on the remaining project pool along the equilibrium
path. Note that R is bounded in the interval R ∈
¡1
k,2
¢
, where the lower (upper) bound corre-
sponds to the case where only safe (risky) projects are left to the SA-bank.
The following Lemma expresses an important insight with respect to Bank A’s project choice:
Lemma 1. If Bank A adopts an IRS, it will strictly prefer either safe or risky projects. That
is, it will choose the maximum feasible number min
¡1
2,n A¢
of its preferred project type and the
residual number max
¡
nA − 1
2,0
¢
of the other.
16Proof. See Appendix.
The Lemma says that Bank A ﬁrst adopts only either safe or risky projects and then ﬁlls
the remainder of its lending capacity with the other project type. We will refer to the case
where the bank prefers risky projects as risk-shifting, and to the case where the bank prefers safe
projects as cherry-picking. To understand the reason behind this result, recall that the bank’s
proﬁt ΠA is a call option on the true value of the loan portfolio, and the expected value of this
call option exhibits the usual convex shape as a function of the risk choice α. This is the reason
why either safe or risky projects are strictly preferred throughout. In fact, given the linearity of
the portfolio choice problem, it is not surprising that the risk choice must be a boundary solution.
The outcome may at ﬁrst appear somewhat counterintuitive: since the bank beneﬁts from risk
taking, one might perhaps think that the bank would at least adopt so many risky projects that
there is some bankruptcy risk. The quality eﬀect k>0.5, however, explains why the expected
proﬁt is strictly decreasing for small values of α when the bankruptcy probability is zero. Note
that the Lemma implies directly that the bank always has an incentive to adopt an IRS if C is
negligible, because the Lemma says that risk-shifting or cherry-picking always yields a strictly
larger proﬁt than any mixed portfolio.
The next question is which of the two policies, cherry-picking or risk-shifting, Bank A will
prefer. As mentioned above, the analysis is complicated by the following endogeneity: on the one
hand, the bank’s decision does not only depend on k, but also on the number of projects nA it
can ﬁnance via bI. But on the other hand, the regulator’s choice of nA may well depend on the
bank’s loan portfolio choice, since the regulator may wish to avoid risk-shifting. Using backwards
induction, we can derive important results for Bank A’s portfolio selection in the third stage of
the game. If Bank A has invested in an IRS, we get:
Lemma 2. Suppose Bank A adopts an IRS. Then there exists a unique threshold ¯ nA such that
Bank A will choose cherry-picking if nA ≤ ¯ nA and risk-shifting if nA > ¯ nA.T h et h r e s h o l d¯ nA is
strictly increasing in k and E over the interval ¯ nA ∈ (0,k+ E).
Proof. See Appendix.
We had seen earlier that the risk choice will always have a boundary solution. Lemma 2
says that the bank’s risk choice will have a single switching point ¯ nA, which has quite intuitive
comparative statics properties. An increase in k means that safe projects are more attractive,
17and an increase in E means that the bank has more to lose in case of bankruptcy. Thus, the
smaller the diﬀerence in expected returns between safe and risky projects, and the more Bank
A is levered up (the relationship between its portfolio nA and its equity E), the more attractive
will be risk-shifting, and the smaller will be the switching point ¯ nA. So the comparative statics
properties of ¯ nA are in accordance with the literature on risk-shifting incentives, going back to
Jensen and Meckling (1976).
The formal analysis (which is relegated to the Appendix) proceeds along the following lines.
Assume that nA ≥ 1
2. Then, with cherry-picking and no failure risk, the bank’s proﬁti sinde-
pendent of the portfolio size, since the interest factor remains unchanged at R =2(the marginal
project picked up by an outside lender is a risky one). With risk-shifting, the bankruptcy proba-
bility is always positive, explaining why the proﬁti si n c r e a s i n gi nnA. So there must be a unique
threshold ¯ nA, and it must exhibit the desired properties. An analogous argument, comparing the
slope of the proﬁt functions under cherry-picking and risk-shifting, extends to the case nA < 1
2.
Finally, we can derive a closed-form expression for the threshold ¯ nA from the condition that
the proﬁts from cherry-picking and from risk-shifting must be equal at this point. The proﬁts
from cherry-picking are given in Eq. (4.2), and the proﬁts from risk-shifting can be obtained from
Eq. (4.7) by setting α =1 :
ΠA
r =( 1− ˜ tA)
¡
E
£
t| t>˜ tA¤
RnA + E − nA¢
. (4.8)
After substituting the bankruptcy threshold ˜ tA in Eq. (4.3) and substituting the corresponding
threshold in the case of risk-shifting in Eq. (4.8), which is simply:
˜ tA =
nA − E
RnA , (4.9)
we can derive the switching point as (we show this in the proof of Lemma 2):
¯ nA =
(2E +2 k − 1)
1
2 − E + k − 1
(2k − 1)
.( 4 . 1 0 )
4.3. Basel II: Optimal Loan Portfolio Size
Based on the two last subsections, we can now ask how many projects the regulator will allocate
to the IRB-bank, thereby taking into account that the risk-shifting incentive is increasing in nA.
We identify three diﬀerent regions depending on the values of the parameters k and E,a n dt h e i r
impact on Bank A’s incentives:
18Proposition 3. Suppose Bank A invests and is regulated as an IRB-bank. Then, the regulator’s
o p t i m a lc h o i c eo fB a n kA’s portfolio size depends on the parameters k and E as follows: (i) Region
1: If ¯ nA ≥ E + k, then the regulator sets nA = E + k,B a n kA opts for cherry-picking and will
be safe. ¯ nA ≥ E + k holds if k and E are suﬃciently large such that E ≥
(1−k)2
2k2 −
¡
k − 1
2
¢
. (ii)
Region 2: If 1
2 ≤ ¯ nA <E+k, the regulator implements nA =¯ nA,B a n kA opts for cherry-picking
and will be risk-free. ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 holds if k and E are suﬃciently large such that k ≥ 5
8 −
E(1−E)
2 . (iii)
Region 3: Finally, if ¯ nA < 1
2, the regulator either implements nA =¯ nA such that Bank A opts for
cherry-picking, or nA =¯ nA + ε such that Bank A opts for risk-shifting. Cherry-picking by Bank
A will be optimal for relatively large values of k and E, and risk-shifting for small values of k and
E.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 divides the parameter space in three regions which are illustrated in Figure 2.
Region 1 refers to the situation where risk-shifting does not constitute a constraint on the portfolio
size, as even with the optimal loan volume Bank A will prefer safe projects. Accordingly, the
capital adequacy requirement b will be adjusted such that Bank A can exactly fund the number
of projects that avoids any bankruptcy risk, nA = k + E.B a n kA will be the larger bank since
E + k>1
2.T h i s “too big to fail” result to banking regulation has already been presented (see
Proposition 2).
Region 2 of Proposition 3 encompasses intermediate values of k and E.B a n kA would adopt
risk-shifting if the regulator implemented nA = E +k, but it is still possible to allocate the larger
p o r t f o l i ot oB a n kA (nA ≥ 1
2) without provoking risk-shifting. It is easy to see when this is the
case: Setting ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 in Eq. (4.10) and solving, we ﬁnd that ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 i fa n do n l yi fk ≥ 5
8 −
E(1−E)
2 .
There can only be two possible optima in this case: either the regulator implements the maximum
loan portfolio size for Bank A that falls just short of the risk-shifting barrier ¯ nA.O rs h ec h o o s e s
nA > ¯ nA, with the consequence that Bank A will select all risky projects. In either case, Bank
A will be the larger bank. As shown in the Appendix, the best choice for the regulator is indeed
to give Bank A the maximum allocation that avoids risk-shifting, ¯ nA. The shelter eﬀect oﬀers a
good intuition: Since Bank A is the larger bank, the loss for society given default will be smaller
if the bankruptcy risk is allocated to the small bank and not the large bank.
For small values of k and E, the situation is described by Region 3. This is probably the most
interesting region since Bank A will always be the smaller bank, contrary to the intuition that
19IRB-banks will have a stronger competitive position, and also contradicting the stated intention
of the Basel Committee to oﬀer lower capital standards for IRB banks. In fact, the problem is
that making Bank A the larger bank will inevitably lead to risk-shifting. As a consequence, the
regulator will prefer to let the IRB-bank be the smaller one. Moreover, if risk-shifting incentives
are very high, then the regulator may be better oﬀ to accommodate Bank A’s risk-shifting, and
still designate Bank A as the smaller bank. Essentially, the reason is that Bank A’s loan portfolio
has then become so small that leaving the entire burden of risky projects to Bank B means
exposing it to a disproportionate bankruptcy risk. It is then better to share the bankruptcy risk
b e t w e e nb o t hb a n k s .
4.4. Hidden Investments in Internal Rating Systems
There is another interesting aspect of Region 3. As seen in Proposition 3, the regulator will then
designate Bank A as the smaller bank, by restricting its portfolio size to nA =¯ nA < 1
2. In other
words, Bank A will be penalized when it submits its IRS for approval to the regulator. But since
this will be anticipated by Bank A, the bank will consider whether it really should apply for the
status of an IRB-bank. If Bank A “hides” the fact that it has developed an IRS, the regulator
has no choice but to apply the capital adequacy requirements of a SA-bank, which, as we saw in
Section 3, guarantees a portfolio of size nu = 1
2 to Bank A. So this is a rather attractive option,
and we can easily verify that Bank A will always prefer it. Namely, for any regulatory policy of
nA < ¯ nA < 1
2,B a n kA’s proﬁts will be strictly increasing in nA.F o rnA > ¯ nA,B a n kA will adopt
risk-shifting, as it will do when it “hides” its investment and gets an allocation of nu = 1
2.S ot h e
last option must yield a strictly larger proﬁtt oB a n kA than any regulation leading to nA < 1
2.
As a consequence, Bank A will hide its investment and fund all of the risky projects, while Bank
B ﬁnances all safe projects.
After substituting Eq. (4.9) into Eq. (4.8), and using nA = 1
2 and R = 1
k (which will
prevail in an equilibrium with risk-shifting), we can determine Bank A’s proﬁts as ΠA
r
¡1
2
¢
=
k
¡ 1
2k + E − 1
2
¢2, and total bankruptcy costs as Zr
¡1
2
¢
= 1
4z + 1
2kz− 7
3kzE.W ec a nt h e ns e ew h y
it can be proﬁtable for Bank A to invest even if it knows that the best strategy ex post is to hide
its IRS capabilities. The gain from being able to engage in risk-shifting on a portfolio of size 1
2,
compared with earnings of Πu =
(1+2E(1+2k))2
8(1+2k) that the bank will obtain when it does not invest
(see Proposition 1), may outweigh the investment cost C if the latter is suﬃciently low.
Naturally, this scenario is alarming for the regulator. We have seen in Proposition 3 that
20once Bank A has invested, the socially optimal portfolio size is nA =¯ nA < 1
2 in Region 3 (which
may or may not lead to risk-shifting). Clearly, the aggregated bankruptcy loss in the case of a
hidden IRS-investment, Zr
¡1
2
¢
, is higher than under the optimal allocation, Zr
¡
¯ nA¢
. Comparing
Zr
¡1
2
¢
to Zu in expression (3.7), it turns out that the overall bankruptcy loss after a hidden
IRS-investment is actually higher than in the Basel I benchmark case!
As we will see next, there is a simple defense for the regulator. The solution for the regulator
will be to oﬀer suﬃciently large subsidies that will entice Bank A to voluntarily submit its IRS
to the regulator.
5. Optimal Banking Regulation
We can now close our analysis by moving backwards to the initial stage 1 of the game, where the
regulator sets the stage by announcing its transfer policy, that is either a subsidy s>0 or a tax
s<0. The transfer will take place if the bank has invested in IRS capabilities an submits them
to the regulator to be licensed as an IRB-bank. We have just seen that one of the reasons why
the regulator will oﬀer subsidies is to make sure that the bank actually oﬃcially registers its IRS
capabilities and will not hide them from the regulator. Another reason is that the investment
criteria of regulator and Bank A will often diverge, and subsidies or taxes for IRS-investments are
a means to align the bank’s decision with the social optimum. It should by now be clear that direct
transfers s strictly dominate any attempt to impose subsidies or taxes indirectly via an adjustment
in the capital adequacy ratios b. The reason is that the regulator has a double objective: to create
optimal investment incentives, and to ensure the optimal risk and loan portfolio allocation. It is
obviously better to use the two instruments s and b to address each of these objectives separately,
rather than to pursue both goals with the single policy instrument b, which inevitably leads to a
conﬂict of objectives for the regulator.
Neglecting shadow costs of public funds, we make a simple utilitarian assumption for this
analysis: the regulator uses public revenues for a subsidy but this will also boost the bank’s net
proﬁt by the same amount, so the transfer is neutral in a welfare sense.
Let us then consider Bank A’s incentive constraint. In view of our analysis in Section 4, it is
clear that Bank A will invest and submit its IRS if and only if
ΠA − C + s ≥ max
½
Πu,ΠA
r
µ
1
2
¶
− C
¾
, (5.1)
where ΠA is Bank A’s proﬁt in the optimal regulation with investment in the three regions,
21and proﬁts for Basel I (Πu) are as derived in Section 3. The regulator will ﬁx the subsidy/tax s at
a level that aligns the bank’s investment decision in stage 2 of the game with the social optimum.
For convenience, we introduce the following simple notation for the bankruptcy losses in
equilibrium as they arise in the three subgames after Bank A’s investment choice in stage 2 (see
Figure 1): we deﬁne Zi =m i n
©
Zc
¡
¯ nA¢
,Z r
¡
¯ nA¢ª
as total bankruptcy loss if Bank A invests and
applies to obtain IRB-status (Basel II),12 and Zh = Zr
¡1
2
¢
= 1
4z + 1
2kz − 7
3kzE if it invests but
hides its IRS. We deﬁne Bank A’s proﬁts Πi and Πh accordingly. For an equilibrium without
investment (Basel I), bankruptcy costs Zu a n db a n kp r o ﬁts Πu are given in expressions (3.7)
and (3.5). The following Lemma summarizes the comparison of the bankruptcy losses after the
diﬀerent choices of Bank A in stage 2, where we refer to the three regions in Figure 2:
Lemma 3. For the equilibrium bankruptcy losses in the game after Bank A’s investment choice,
we get Zi ≤ Zh.I nR e g i o n1 ,Zi <Z u. In Regions 2 and 3, Zi ≶ Zu.
Proof. See Appendix.
This comparison provides the basis for the determination of the regulator’s optimal overall
policy. Lemma 3 expresses the regulator’s preferences for the diﬀerent investment choices: for the
regulator, a choice by Bank A to invest but hide its IRS will always be dominated, because Zh
and Zi both refer to situations after costs of C are invested. It follows immediately that whenever
the bank would prefer to invest-and-hide, the regulator will take preemptive action and employ
subsidies s that are suﬃcient to satisfy incentive constraint (5.1) and will ensure that the Bank
will submit its IRS capabilities for oﬃcial approval. As we have seen, this happens in Region 3.
In Regions 1 and 2, for high and intermediate values of k and E, the optimal Basel II regulation
in the absence of risk-shifting is also better than a uniform banking sector (Basel I), at least as
long as investment costs C are ignored. There are two reasons for that: First, there is an interest
rate eﬀect.W i t had i ﬀerentiated banking regulation (Basel II) and cherry-picking by Bank A,t h e
interest rate is larger than in the uniform Basel I case, since the quality of the marginal project
funded by a SA-bank is lower (the interest factors are R =2and R = 4
(1+2k), respectively).
Higher proﬁts make banks more stable, whereas the wealth distribution eﬀect cancels out in the
regulators’ objective function. Thus, quality diﬀerentiation among banks serves as a convenient
tool to reduce banking competition. Second, there is a risk and size diﬀerentiation eﬀect.W i t ha
diﬀerentiated banking sector, the regulator can now use capital adequacy regulation to eﬀectively
12As we saw in Proposition 3, the regulatory will then normally implement cherry-picking, but for low values of
k and E may prefer risk-shifting. This explains the min{.} in the deﬁnition of Zi.
22diﬀerentiate the risk allocation and the portfolio size across banks. The number of safe projects
picked up by the Bank A eﬀectively bolsters its equity, since all risk of these projects washes out
as a portfolio diversiﬁcation eﬀect. In the optimal policy, only the small bank (which necessarily
is Bank B) bears bankruptcy risk, not the large bank.
Interestingly, the superiority of the Basel II-regulation is increasing in k, but decreasing in
E. As for the return parameter k that measures the relative attractiveness of safe over risky
projects, this eﬀect is quite straightforward. In fact, the larger is k, the more important is the
interest rate eﬀect, and this will dominate all other eﬀects in equilibrium. The fact that the
advantage is decreasing in E follows from two eﬀects: ﬁrst, under Basel I, both banks have a
positive bankruptcy risk which is decreasing in E. And second, the lower the interest rate, the
more important is the equity E in order to reduce the failure risk. In fact, the diﬀerence in the
marginal impact of E on the uniform and the diﬀerentiated banking is increasing in k, because the
interest rate in the uniform case is decreasing in k, while it is independent of k in the diﬀerentiated
case.
The opposite roles of k and E in the welfare comparison can also be explained when providing
an intuition why, according to Lemma 3, in Regions 2 and 3 the bankruptcy loss may be smaller
in the Basel I outcome than in the case where Bank A invests, prefers cherry-picking and is
allowed to ﬁnance nA =m i n
©
¯ nA,k+ E
ª
projects. This is, at ﬁrst, a surprising observation: the
interest rate and size diﬀerentiation eﬀect would rather suggest the opposite. However, if k is
small, then ¯ nA is relatively close to 1
2, so neither size diﬀerentiation nor the interest rate eﬀect -
which describes the variation of R in the interval
¡1
k,2
¢
- are very important. On the other hand,
since Bank A does not ﬁnance any risky projects, its equity E is idling, i.e. it is not employed
to absorb the portion of risk that the bank can assume without incurring any failure risk (any
nA ≤ E), an ineﬃciency that is increasing in E. This intuition suggests that Basel I can be more
attractive for the regulator than Basel II for small k and relatively large equity endowments E.
The ﬁnal question of our analysis is then whether it is always feasible for the regulator to
implement the preferred allocation. The diﬃculty is that the preferences of Bank A and the
regulator may well diﬀer. Consider Region 2 as an example. Then, we already know that Πi−Πu >
0 as proﬁts are increasing in nA, so that an investment is always optimal for the bank for small
investment costs C. On the other hand, we also know from Lemma 3 that total bankruptcy costs
may be smaller in the Basel I outcome (Zu − Zi < 0), so that an investment is never desirable.
In general, for the regulator, the Basel II outcome is superior to Basel I when Zu−Zi ≥ C,i . e .
if investment costs yield a suﬃcient return in form of lower bankruptcy costs. Bank A,h o w e v e r ,
23will only invest and submit for certiﬁcation if incentive constraint (5.1) holds. We say that there
is an overinvestment problem if Zu −Zi <C≤ max{Πi,Πh}−Πu, so that the bank would invest
(safe for the remedial tax/subsidy s that we will consider in a moment), whereas the regulator
wouldn’t. Conversely, we say that there is an underinvestment problem if Πi−Πu <C≤ Zu−Zi,
so that the regulator wants to invest whereas the bank will not, unless it obtains subsidies when
it does. Finally, we say that the preferences of the regulator are aligned if both Zu − Zi ≥ C
and Πi − Πu ≥ C or Zu − Zi <Cand Πi − Πu <Chold simultaneously. The decision on the
subsidy/tax s in stage 1 then leads to the following outcome in the overall equilibrium of the
game:
Proposition 4. (i) In Regions 1 and 2, if preferences are aligned, then the outcome will be
Basel II with nA =m i n
©
¯ nA,k+ E
ª
if Zu − Zi ≥ C, and Basel I otherwise. There will be no
tax or subsidy. If there is an underinvestment problem, then the outcome will be Basel II with
nA =m i n
©
¯ nA,k+ E
ª
, and there will be a subsidy of s ≥ C − (Πi − Πu). Finally, if there is an
overinvestment problem,a n di fC>Πh − Πu, then the outcome will be Basel I and there will
be a tax of s ≤ C − (Πh − Πu) < 0;i fC ≤ Πh − Πu, then the outcome will be Basel II with
nA =m i n
©
¯ nA,k+ E
ª
,a n ds =0 .
(ii) In Region 3, if preferences are aligned or there is an overinvestment problem and if Zu−Zi ≥
C, there will be a subsidy of s ≥ Πh − Πi, and the outcome will be Basel II with nA =¯ nA < 1
2,
and the outcome will be Basel I if Zu −Zi <C . If there is an underinvestment problem, then the
outcome will be Basel II with nA =¯ nA < 1
2, and there will be a subsidy of s ≥ C − (Πi − Πu).
Proof. See Appendix.
The ﬁrst part of item (i) of the Proposition is straightforward. If the preferences are aligned,
then Bank A invests if and only if this is also socially beneﬁcial, so that no subsidies or taxes are
required to reach the optimum. Recall from Lemma 4 that this will always be Basel II if investment
costs C are suﬃciently small and if there is no risk-shifting problem, i.e. if nA = E + k with
cherry-picking is feasible. If this is not feasible, the outcome may be Basel II with cherry-picking
or with risk-shifting, but it may also be Basel I with a uniform banking sector even for C =0 .
The second part, concerning underinvestment, says that the regulator will always be in a
position to implement Basel II if this is the best outcome. So together with the ﬁrst part, this
shows that the outcome will be Basel II whenever this is preferred by the regulator, regardless
of Bank A’s preferences. The reason is that by oﬀering a high enough subsidy, the regulator can
24always induce the bank to invest and to obtain the certiﬁcation as an IRB-bank. Hence, absent
shadow costs of public funds, underinvestment problems can be perfectly addressed.
The ﬁnal part of item (i) addresses overinvestment situations, which pose a somewhat more
intricate problem. In principle, the regulator can deter an investment application by taxing an
IRS at a suﬃciently high rate. But then, Bank A still has the option to invest and hide its
IRS. This puts a cap on the maximum tax that is enforceable, and explains why the relevant
comparison is now between Bank A’s proﬁtw h e ni td o e sn o ti n v e s t ,Πu, and its net proﬁtw h e ni t
invests and hides, Πh−C. If the latter investment option yields a net proﬁtb e l o wt h ep r o ﬁtw i t h
a uniform banking sector (Πh − C<Πu),13 then the regulator can indeed attain the optimum
with a tax that will prevent Bank A from making the investment. But if Πh − C ≥ Πu, then the
bank will invest anyway, and the regulator, anticipating investment, prefers the optimal solution
¯ nA to nA = 1
2, will accommodate the overinvestment, and the outcome will again be Basel II with
the optimal allocation ¯ nA.
The intuition for item (ii) of the Proposition is as follows. In Region 3, if Bank A invests, it
should optimally be designated as the smaller bank, ¯ nA < 1
2. Therefore, it would normally hide
its IRS from the regulator, which leads to a suboptimal portfolio and risk allocation as we had
seen in Section 4.4. Therefore, the regulator will always prevent this outcome from occurring by
oﬀering a subsidy that entices Bank A to become an IRB-bank if it invests. This explains why
subsidies can be the optimal outcome even in case of an overinvestment situation.
In conclusion, underinvestment situations can always be remedied with subsidies, but the
same does not hold for overinvestment problems. There are situations where Bank A will invest
anyway, notably to take advantage of risk-shifting opportunities, and the regulator has no choice
but to set incentives to apply for a licence. Overinvestment problems are more likely to occur
if risk-shifting incentives are high (k is small), banks are undercapitalized (E is small), or if the
social cost of bankruptcy is small (z is small).
Thus, our analysis exposes a defensive side of the proposed Basel II Accord: faced with the
prospect of advanced banks acquiring increasingly sophisticated screening capabilities, the best
option for regulators is to accommodate this development in order to secure control over the
allocation of risks within an increasingly diﬀerentiated banking sector. If many banks will rapidly
embrace Basel II and receive regulatory approval to operate as IRB-banks, that does not mean
that the process is socially optimal. It can simply be an expression of regulatory capture, or of
13Note that this is not excluded by the deﬁnition of an overinvestment problem as we may have Π
∗
r < Π
∗
c.
25a situation where it is impossible for regulators to keep pace with banks’ increasingly advanced
tools. In the same vein, if regulators ﬁnd it optimal to grant subsidies for banks willing to invest
to be ready for the IRB-approach, that does not mean that the IRS-investment is socially optimal.
6. Discussion and Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to analyze a particular aspect of the proposed Basel II Accord,
namely the intention to diﬀerentiate between banks that use internal ratings and banks that use
the standard approach. We investigate general equilibrium eﬀects of this proposal in a simple
model where one of the banks has the opportunity to invest and get approval for the use of
internal ratings.
Absent risk-shifting incentives, we ﬁnd that the regulator will assign lower risk-adjusted capital
requirements to the internal ratings bank (IRB-bank), and increase its market share. We argue
that the diﬀerentiation under the Basel II Accord will aﬀect welfare through two distinct channels,
an interest rate eﬀe c t( t h ea n t i c o m p e t i t i v ee ﬀect of higher interest rates if banks become more
heterogenous) and a size and risk diﬀerentiation eﬀect, which refers to economies of scale in the
absorption of bank failure risk. This eﬀect implies that welfare generally increases if failure risk is
allocated asymmetrically across banks, and if the risky banks are put at a regulatory disadvantage.
This allows safe bank to gain market share and hence shelter a larger fraction of the overall loan
portfolio from failure risk. Interest rate and size diﬀerentiation eﬀect both favor the diﬀerentiation
among banks proposed by the Basel Committee, and hence we ﬁnd a positive welfare impact of
the proposal if investment costs in more advanced internal ratings system are small.
But the picture becomes more intricate when we consider that IRB-banks can use their in-
formational advantage to manipulate the riskiness of their loan portfolios and to engage in risk-
shifting. We ﬁnd that, when risk-shifting incentives are strong, then the interest rate eﬀect and
the diﬀerentiation eﬀect become less and less important, and may eventually be overshadowed by
the ineﬃcient risk absorption of the safe bank. Then, the regulator should curtail the lending of
IRB-banks so much that they are at a competitive disadvantage compared with SA-banks.
The regulator will use monetary incentives to align the investment incentives of banks with the
social optimum that takes account of externalities and contagion eﬀe c t sl i n k e dt ob a n kf a i l u r e .W e
ﬁnd that lump-sum transfers will strictly dominate any policy of handing out subsidies indirectly
via lower capital adequacy ratios. The reason is that the regulator pursues two diﬀerent objectives,
to align investment incentives and to control the optimal portfolio allocation across banks, and
26that she needs two separate policy instruments to avoid conﬂicts. The regulatory can usually
avoid underinvestment problems, but is frequently forced to accommodate situations where banks
ineﬃciently overinvest into their internal ratings system. Massive adoption of the IRB-approach
is, therefore, not synonymous to a welfare improvement.
Our analysis helps to identify several aspects that merit close regulatory attention: ﬁrst, the
loan portfolio quality of banks using the standard approach will generally worsen, as a result
of the cherry picking by sophisticated banks. Second, internal rating banks may be inclined
to manipulate their portfolios and to take on excessive risks. Third, the investment incentives
of banks to foster their internal ratings systems will normally not be aligned with the socially
preferred outcome, and overinvestment will occur. Finally, this problem is likely to be exacerbated
if there are conﬂicts of interest whether banks will truthfully disclose the full extent of their
knowledge in internal rating models and risk calculation models.
Our model is certainly stylized, but its simple structure has the merit to analyze the conse-
quences for bank stability, ﬁnancial market structure, lending rates ad social eﬃciency in a single
coherent framework that allows to distinguish between the private and the social implications of
bank activity. A few of our simplifying assumptions merit some discussion. First, when analyzing
the regulator’s policy of subsidies or tax levies on IRB-banks, we made the utilitarian assumption
that any such transfer is neutral from a welfare point of view. This is certainly not realistic as
there are usually shadow costs associated with the use of public funds. While we believe that
this is important, we chose to omit it since it would complicate our analysis considerably without
adding much from an analytical point of view. Suppose that one euro in subsidies costs λ>1
euros if ﬁnanced by taxes. Then, a subsidy will be granted only if Zu − Zi ≥ C + λs.T h i sh a s
no important impact on the qualitative essence of our ﬁndings, but would force us to distinguish
additional cases.
Second, concerning the returns and return correlations of projects, our maintained assumption
in the analysis is that safe projects also yield higher expected returns. At ﬁrst glance, this as-
sumption seems to contradict the usual relation between risk and return on ﬁnancial markets. But
notice that our assumption merely reﬂects the well-known perverse incentives in banks’ portfolio
selection: banks with positive bankruptcy risk and no regulation usually have strong incentives
to increase the systematic risk in their portfolio if it does not hurt their expected return (see e.g.
Acharya, 2001). In an equilibrium market model, therefore, the factor premium for systematic
risk should be negative. For assets with high systematic risk, banks should on average charge a
lower interest rate. We model this insight by assuming that correlated projects have, for identical
27interest rates, a lower success probability.
From our discussion in Section 4.3, it is now straightforward to see what happens if k<1
2:i t
would just be an extension of the case k & 1
2 that we analyzed in Proposition 3 and following.
Risk-shifting would become unavoidable if bank A adopts an internal rating system, but the
regulator would like to avoid risk-shifting as often as possible. As a consequence, adopting the
dual approach that Basel II proposes and allowing banks to adopt and use their own rating
systems will lead to an eﬃciency loss compared with the status quo, which corresponds to a
uniform banking sector.
Third, we assumed that bankruptcy losses nz are linear. The linearity ensures the formal
tractability and closed form characterization of our analysis. Recall that z captures the social
losses of bank failure, due to disruption in the ﬁnancial system and ﬁnancial fragility, and it
seems natural to assume that these losses are increasing in the size of the failed bank. We do
not have a strong view whether a neoclassical assumption of convex bankruptcy losses, or rather
concave costs reﬂecting some economies of scale in the social response to a bank’s failure would
be the natural extension, and so the linear case may be viewed as a compromise between these
two conﬂicting views. As long as bankruptcy losses a r ea s s u m e dt ob ei n c r e a s i n g( c o n v e xl i n e a r ,
or concave), the qualitative message of our model should go through.
Finally, our model expressed a strong view on the superior screening capacity of high banks
which have perfect information about the credit risk associated with each project while SA-banks
and regulators can share none of it. Again, this is a simplifying assumption. The important
element is merely that there is an information diﬀerential between IRB-banks on the one hand,
and regulators on the other, that banks can exploit opportunistically. As long as this is the case,
there is reason to be concerned about the problems that we identify, namely the deterioration of
the project pool for SA-banks and the risk-shifting problem.
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .We ﬁrst need to show that the optimal nu is either nu = E(1+2k) or
nu = 1
2. Taking the partial derivative of Wu yields
∂Wu
∂nu
=
1
2
X + Xk− 2 − z.( A . 1 )
Hence, Wu is linear in nu.I f1
2X + Xk− 2 − z>0, total welfare is strictly increasing in nu,
which means that the regulator allows for all projects. Otherwise, the regulator chooses bu such
that the bankruptcy risk is zero, which is the case for nu ≤ E(1 + 2k). ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . In Proposition 2, we restrict attention to nA ≥ 1
2.L e tZA
c (ZB
c )b e
the bankruptcy loss from Bank A (Bank B). We take the expression of total social costs of bank
failure Zc in Eq. (4.6) and substitute ˜ tA from Eq. (4.3) and ˜ tB from eq. (4.5). This yields:
Zc = ZA
c + ZB
c =
nA − E − k
2nA − 1
nAz +
1 − nA − E
2
z.
Taking the derivative w.r.t. nA gives
∂Zc
∂nA =
1
2(2nA − 1)
z (2E +2 k − 1) > 0.( A . 2 )
This proves that Zc is increasing in nA if nA >k+E,i . e .i fB a n kA faces a positive bankruptcy
risk. Otherwise, if only Bank B may go bankrupt, total bankruptcy costs are simply
Zc = ZB
c =
1 − nA − E
2
z, (A.3)
as ZA
c =0 . It follows that
∂ZB
c
∂nA = −
1
2
z<0 .( A . 4 )
Since ∂Zc
∂nA > 0 if nA >k+E and ∂Zc
∂nA < 0 if nA <k+E, it is optimal to implement nA = k+E.
We also clearly have that total bankruptcy costs are decreasing in nA for all nA < 1
2 (a formal
proof follows the argument in Proposition 3 for the case nA < ¯ nA). Total bankruptcy costs as
stated in the Proposition follow immediately from substituting nB =1−nA =1−E −k in Bank
B’s bankruptcy costs, and from taking into account that ZA
c =0 . ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .R e c a l l t h a t α is the percentage of risky projects in the bank’s portfolio.
Hence, as a function of α,t h ep r o ﬁti sg i v e nb y :
ΠA =( 1− ˜ tA)
¡
(1 − α)kRnA + αE
£
t| t ≥ ˜ tA¤
RnA + E − nA¢
.( A . 5 )
32The bankruptcy threshold is thus:
˜ tA =m a x
µ
nA − E − kRnA(1 − α)
αRnA ,0
¶
.( A . 6 )
Eq. (A.6) deﬁnes a threshold value of α =¯ α such that ˜ tA =0for all α ≤ ¯ α and ˜ tA > 0 for all
α>¯ α.N o t et h a tα ≤ ¯ α is feasible for all values of nA ≤ k + E. Hence:
E
£
t | t ≥ ˜ tA¤
=m a x
µ
1
2
,
RnA (α − k + kα) − E + nA
2αRnA
¶
.( A . 7 )
Substituting for E
£
t | t ≥ ˜ tA¤
in Eq. (A.5), proﬁts can be rewritten as:
ΠA =
⎧
⎨
⎩
(1 − α)nAkR+ αnA 1
2R + E − nA if ˜ tA =0
(αRnA+kRnA(1−α)+E−nA)
2
2αRnA if ˜ tA > 0
.( A . 8 )
For α ≤ ¯ α, ˜ tA =0 . As we would expect, proﬁts are strictly declining in α as long as α<¯ α,
∂ΠA
∂α
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α<¯ α
= nAR
µ
1
2
− k
¶
< 0.( A . 9 )
If bankruptcy is possible (α>¯ α), we get
∂ΠA
∂α
¯
¯ ¯ ¯
α>¯ α
= −
1
8α2RnA
³¡
2kRnA +2 E − 2nA¢2
−
¡
(2 − 2k)RnAα
¢2´
.( A . 1 0 )
The second derivative is:
∂2ΠA
∂α2
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
α>¯ α
=
1
4
4E2 − 8EnA +4
¡
nA¢2 +4 k2R2 ¡
nA¢2 − 8kR
¡
nA¢2 +8 kRnAE
α3RnA .( A . 1 1 )
Now ∂2ΠA
∂α2 > 0 if the numerator is positive. We will show that the numerator is strictly positive
for all feasible values of R, R ∈
£1
k,2
¤
.N o t et h a t :
∂(·)
∂R
³
4E2 − 8EnA +4
¡
nA¢2
+4 k2R2 ¡
nA¢2
− 8kR
¡
nA¢2
+8 kRnAE
´
(A.12)
=8 k2R
¡
nA¢2
− 8k
¡
nA¢2
+8 knAE>0.
Hence it is suﬃcient to show that ∂2ΠA
∂α2 > 0 for the minimum R ≡ Rmin = 1
k. Substituting Rmin
in the numerator of (A.11) yields:
∂2ΠA(Rmin)
∂α2 =4 E2 > 0.( A . 1 3 )
33Hence ΠA is continuous and globally convex, strictly decreasing for all α<¯ α and strictly
convex for all α>¯ α,i m p l y i n gt h a tΠA has no interior maximum. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .
We begin with the following Lemma that allows us to restrict our proof to the properties of
¯ nA:
Lemma 4. There can be at most a single threshold ¯ nA where Bank A switches from cherry-
p i c k i n gt or i s k - s h i f t i n g .
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 .First, consider the case where nA ∈ (1
2,k+E).P r o ﬁts with cherry-picking
are:
ΠA
c =
1
2
kR+
µ
nA −
1
2
¶
1
2
R + E − nA (A.14)
as the bank faces no bankruptcy risk. For proﬁts with risk-shifting, by using the proﬁt
expression from the proof of Lemma 1 and taking into account that with risk-shifting we have
αnA = 1
2,i tf o l l o w s :
ΠA
r =
¡1
2R + kR
¡
nA − 1
2
¢
+ E − nA¢2
R
.( A . 1 5 )
Let ∆ΠA = ΠA
c −ΠA
r denote the proﬁtd i ﬀerence. From Lemma 1, we know that in equilibrium
there will be either cherry-picking or risk-shifting, so either R =2or R = 1
k. Thus, it is suﬃcient
to show that, for either of these two values of R:
∂∆Π
∂nA =
∂
¡
ΠA
c − ΠA
r
¢
∂nA < 0
such that the proﬁtd i ﬀerence is indeed decreasing in nA.N o w
∂∆ΠA
∂nA =
1
2
R +
1
R
¡
−2nA +2 E
¢
− k +4 knA − 2kE + R
¡
k2 − k − 2k2nA¢
.( A . 1 6 )
If R =2 , we get:
∂∆ΠA
∂nA = −(2k − 1)
¡
E − nA − k +2 knA +1
¢
< 0,( A . 1 7 )
and if R = 1
k,w eg e t :
∂∆ΠA
∂nA = −2knA +2 kE +2 nA − 2E −
1
2k
< 0,( A . 1 8 )
showing the claim.
34Second, consider nA >k+E. In this case, Bank A will no longer be defaultfree when cherry-
picking, and hence we get as proﬁt expression in the cherry-picking case:
ΠA
c =( 1 −˜ tA)
µ
1
2
kR +
µ
nA −
1
2
¶
E
£
t | t ≥ ˜ tA¤
R + E − nA
¶
=
¡
2E − R + Rk − 2nA +2 RnA¢2
4(2nA − 1)R
.
As the residual project is risky, we have R =2and thus
ΠA
c =
¡
E − 1+k + nA¢2
(2nA − 1)
.
Taking the derivative yields:
∂
∂nA
Ã¡
E − 1+k + nA¢2
(2nA − 1)
!
=2
µ
1
2nA − 1
¡
k + nA + E − 1
¢µ
1 −
1
2nA − 1
¡
k + nA + E − 1
¢¶¶
< 0.
On the other hand, for the proﬁt in the risk-shifting case, the derivative is:
∂ΠA
r
∂n
=
∂
∂nA
Ãµ
1+2 k
µ
nA −
1
2
¶
+ E − nA
¶2!
=2( 2 k − 1)
¡
E − nA − k +2 knA +1
¢
> 0.
Taking together, this shows again that ∂∆ΠA
∂nA < 0.
Third, consider the case ¯ nA < 1
2.B a n kA will again choose cherry-picking iﬀ ΠA
c ≥ ΠA
r ,w h i c h
for nA < 1
2 gives:
nAkR + E − nA ≥
¡
nAE
£
t|t>˜ t
¤
R + E − nA¢¡
1 − ˜ tA¢
.( A . 1 9 )
The switching point ¯ nA < 1
2 is given by equality in (A.19). Using E
£
t|t>˜ tA¤¡
1 − ˜ tA¢
=
1−(˜ tA)
2
2 and ˜ tA = nA−E
nAR , Inequality (A.19) can be written as:
nAR
Ã
k −
1
2
+
¡
nA − E
¢2
2(nAR)
2
!
≥
¡
nA − E
¢2
nAR
,
hence
¡
nAR
¢2
(2k − 1) ≥
¡
nA − E
¢2
.( A . 2 0 )
Introducing equality in (A.20), taking roots on both sides and deﬁning
x =
1
√
2k − 1
35yields ¯ nA < 1
2, the maximum lending where Bank A will be cherry-picking in equilibrium, as:
¯ nA =
x
x − R
E.( A . 2 1 )
Finally, we observe that, as the equilibrium switches from cherry-picking to risk-shifting, the
equilibrium interest factor R adjusts downwards in all three regions of ¯ nA. Thus, our assumption
on market beliefs (footnote 6) rules out any ambiguity about the switching point: ¯ nA is the
maximum lending level where cherry-picking is sustainable for R corresponding to a cherry-picking
equilibrium, and for any nA > ¯ nA, risk-shifting (with the associated lower R) is an equilibrium.
¥
G i v e nL e m m a4 ,w ec a nn o wd e r i v eac l o s e de x p r e s s i o nf o r¯ nA ≥ 1
2 as stated in the text. As ¯ nA
is the maximum lending level where Bank A chooses cherry-picking, we have R =2 . Substituting
into the proﬁt expression yields for any nA ≤ k + E:
ΠA
c = E + k −
1
2
,
which is independent of nA as risky projects just break even. If Bank A deviated to risk-
shifting, then still R =2 , and from (A.15) we have:
ΠA
r =
1
2
¡
E − nA + k
¡
2nA − 1
¢
+1
¢2
.
Since ¯ nA is deﬁned as the point where ΠA
r = ΠA
c ,i tf o l l o w s
1
2
¡
E − nA + k
¡
2nA − 1
¢
+1
¢2
= E + k −
1
2
,
which we can solve as:
¯ nA =
(2E +2 k − 1)
1
2 − E + k − 1
(2k − 1)
(A.22)
as stated in the text, and which gives us
¯ nA Q
1
2
⇔ k Q
5
8
−
E (1 − E)
2
.( A . 2 3 )
Furthermore, note that the bank strictly prefers risky projects for k = 1
2 as
ΠA
c − ΠA
r =
µ
k + E −
1
2
¶
−
¡
1+2 knA − k + E − nA¢2
2
,( A . 2 4 )
and hence
36ΠA
c − ΠA
r
µ
k =
1
2
¶
= −
1
2
E2 +
1
2
E −
1
8
< 0.( A . 2 5 )
It remains to show that ¯ nA is monotonic in k and E.
Consider ﬁrst ¯ nA ≥ 1
2. W et a k et h ee x p r e s s i o nf o r¯ nA in (A.22) and analyze the derivative
with respect to k:
∂
∂k
Ã
(2E +2 k − 1)
1
2 − E + k − 1
(2k − 1)
!
=
1
2k − 1
µ
1
√
2k +2 E − 1
+1
¶
+
2
(2k − 1)
2
³
E − k −
√
2k +2 E − 1+1
´
.
As u ﬃcient condition for this expression to be positive is:
¡√
2k +2 E − 1 − 4E − 2k +2 E
√
2k +2 E − 1+1
¢
√
2k +2 E − 1
> 0.
This is positive if the numerator is positive, or if
(1 + 2E)
√
2k +2 E − 1 > 4E +2 k − 1.
After taking squares, factoring and smaller manipulations, we ﬁnd that this must be true since
¡
4E2 − 2E − 2k +1
¢
=2 E (2E − 1) + 1 − 2k<0,
which shows that ¯ nA is indeed monotonic in k.
Finally, taking derivatives of ¯ nA with respect to E :
∂¯ nA
∂E
=
∂
∂E
Ã
(2E +2 k − 1)
1
2 − E + k − 1
(2k − 1)
!
=
1
2k − 1
µ
1
√
2k +2 E − 1
− 1
¶
> 0.
Consider ﬁnally the case of ¯ nA < 1
2.
We show the monotonicity of ¯ nA as deﬁned in (A.21), with respect to E and n.W i t hr e s p e c t
to E, the monotonicity follows immediately from (A.21), as neither x nor R depend on E.W i t h
respect to k the argument is more involved as both x and R depend on k.M o r e o v e r ,R depends
on n.
Taking this endogeneity into account, the derivative of (A.21) gives:
∂¯ nA
∂k
=
−Rx0 + xR0
(x − R)
2 E.
37Since we want to show that ∂¯ nA
∂k > 0, we need to show that:
−Rx0 + xR0 > 0 ⇔ R0 >
R
x
x0.
Further, note for the total diﬀerential R0 that:
R0 =
dR
dk
=
∂R
∂k
+
∂R
∂n
∂n
∂k
>
∂R
∂k
,
since
∂R
∂nA =
∂
∂nA
Ã
1 − nA
1
4 + k
¡1
2 − nA¢
!
=4
¡
4knA − 2k − 1
¢−2
(2k − 1) > 0
and since by assumption, ∂¯ nA
∂k > 0.S oas u ﬃcient condition is:
∂R
∂k
>x 0R
x
(A.26)
(we show in eﬀect that keeping ¯ nA constant in the diﬀerential ∂R
∂k,i tm u s tb et h a t∂¯ nA
∂k > 0.
Taking this eﬀect on dR
dk into account, the eﬀect must hold a fortiori).
Then:
x0 =
dx
dk
= −
1
(2k − 1)
√
2k − 1
.
Both derivatives are negative. Using these expressions, substituting for R/x and simplifying,
(A.26) can be rewritten as
8
¡
1 − nA¢¡
1 − 2nA¢
(4knA − 2k − 1)
2 <
1
2k − 1
1 − nA
1
4 + k
¡1
2 − nA¢ .( A . 2 7 )
Taking derivative w.r.t. nA on the lhs of (A.27):
∂
∂nA
Ã
8
¡
1 − nA¢¡
1 − 2nA¢
(4knA − 2k − 1)
2
!
=
8
¡
−4nA(1 − k) − 2k +3
¢
(4knA − 2k − 1)
3 < 0,
and on the rhs of (A.27):
∂
∂nA
Ã
1 − nA
1
4 + k
¡1
2 − nA¢
!
=
4(2k − 1)
(4knA − 2k − 1)
2 > 0.
So a suﬃcient condition is that (A.27) holds at nA =0 :
8
(−2k − 1)
2 <
1
2k − 1
1
1
4 + k1
2
,
38which is equivalent to:
8
(1 + 2k)
<
4
2k − 1
,
and this condition is true for all k ∈
¡1
2,1
¢
. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .
Part (i). We already know that nA = E+k is optimal in the class of cherry-picking allocations,
a n dt h i sa l l o c a t i o ni sf e a s i b l ei nR e g i o n1b yd e ﬁnition. Finally, the proof of part (ii) below implies
that nA = E + k is superior to any risk-shifting allocation.
Part (ii). Here, we consider situations where the optimal nA = E + k without risk-shifting is
not feasible as ¯ nA <E+ k. The boundaries for ¯ nA are known from section 4.2. We prove that
nA =¯ nA > 1
2 is optimal. Consider ﬁrst the case nA > ¯ nA, meaning that Bank A is risk-shifting.
Then, Bank B faces no bankruptcy risk, and Bank A earns proﬁts of
ΠA
r =( 1− ˜ tA)
∙µ
nA −
1
2
¶
kR+
1
2
E
£
t|t>˜ tA¤
R + E − nA
¸
.( A . 2 8 )
Note that R = 1
k, since we analyze bankruptcy costs in an equilibrium with risk-shifting, so
that the projects expected by Bank B are all safe ones. Thus, the expected bankruptcy probability,
again obtained as the marginal t where [.]=0in Eq. (A.28), is ˜ tA = k(1 − 2E).H e n c e ,
Zr(nA)=nAzk(1 − 2E),( A . 2 9 )
and ∂Zr
∂nA = zk(1 − 2E) > 0.T h u s ,given risk-shifting, nA =¯ nA + ε would be optimal.
Bankruptcy costs with cherry-picking, Zc(¯ nA),a r eZc(¯ nA)=1
2z
¡
1 − ¯ nA − E
¢
,s i n c eo n l yB a n k
B faces positive bankruptcy risk. Hence, we have
Zc(¯ nA) − Zr = z
µ
1
2
¡
1 − ¯ nA − E
¢
− nAk(1 − 2E)
¶
(A.30)
≤ z
µ
1
4
(1 − 2E) −
k(1 − 2E)
2
¶
< 0,
w h e r ew em a d eu s eo fnA ≥ 1
2, ¯ nA ≥ 1
2 and k ≥ 1
2.
Part (iii). Finally, we turn to the case where ¯ nA < 1
2, meaning that the bank would shift risk
even if it gets only half of the projects. We show that for all ¯ nA < 1
2, the optimal regulation is
nA → ¯ nA, which could either be the ¯ nA which is the maximum value for cherry-picking, or the
limit for the minimal value where risk-shifting occurs (nA & ¯ nA).
To show this, we consider ﬁrst the case nA ≤ ¯ nA. In this case, Bank A cherry-picks, and only
Bank B is risky. Bank B’s bankruptcy probability is given by
µ
1
2
− nA
¶
kR +
1
2
˜ tBR + E −
¡
1 − nA¢
=0
39which yields
˜ tB =2
1 − nA − E −
¡1
2 − nA¢
kR
R
.
Substituting the interest factor which is given by R = 1−nA
1
4+k(
1
2−nA) and simplifying gives
˜ tB =
1
2
−
E
¡1
2 + k
¡
1 − 2nA¢¢
1 − nA .
T h ea s s o c i a t e dw e l f a r el o s si s
Zc = ZB
c =
¡
1 − nA¢
˜ tB
=
¡
1 − nA¢ 1
2
z − E
µ
1
2
+ k
¡
1 − 2nA¢¶
z.( A . 3 1 )
We ﬁnd that
∂Zc
∂nA =2 kEz −
1
2
z<0,
where the inequality follows from E ≤ 1
2(1+2k). Hence, the regulator will choose the largest
possible nA in this case, nA =¯ nA.
Consider then the case of nA > ¯ nA. In this case, Bank A chooses risk-shifting, and either both
banks or only Bank A are risky.
Bank A will be bankrupt if
nA˜ tAR + E − nA =0 .
Hence
˜ tA =
nA − E
nAR
=
1
2
¡
nA − E
¢¡
k − nA + 1
2
¢
nA (1 − nA)
,
where the last equality obtains after substituting the interest factor R =2 1−nA
k−nA+1
2
(with Bank
B ﬁnancing 1 − nA projects of which 1
2 are safe).
Consider ﬁr s tt h es u b c a s ew h e r enA is small enough so that both banks bear bankruptcy risk.
The bankruptcy risk of Bank B, ˜ tB,i sg i v e nb y :
˜ tB =
¡
1 − nA − E − 1
2Rk
¢
R
¡1
2 − nA¢
which we derive from:
1
2
kR+
µ
1
2
− nA
¶
˜ tBR + E −
¡
1 − nA¢
=0 .
40Using R =
2(1−nA)
k−nA+1
2
and simplifying, we get
˜ tB =
¡
1 − nA¢¡1
2 − nA¢
− E
¡
k − nA + 1
2
¢
2(1− nA)
¡1
2 − nA¢ .
Hence, for the total bankruptcy loss, we get:
Zr = nA˜ tA +
¡
1 − nA¢
˜ tB
=
1
2
¡
nA − E
¢¡
k − nA + 1
2
¢
(1 − nA)
z −
E
¡
k − nA + 1
2
¢
1 − nA
2
z +
¡
1 − nA¢
2
z.( A . 3 2 )
We will then show that ∂Zr
∂nA > 0:
∂Zr
∂nA =
Ã
E(3 − 2k)
(2 − nA)
2 +
¡
1+2 E +2 k − 4nA¢
4(1− nA)
+
¡
1+2 k − 2nA¢
4(1− nA)
2
¡
nA − E
¢
−
1
2
!
z
=
Ã
(2k − 1)(1 − E)
4(1− nA)
2 +
E(3 − 2k)
(2 − nA)
2
!
z>0. (A.33)
Consider then the subcase where nA is large enough that only Bank A bears bankruptcy risk.
In this case, if nA < 1
2, then the bankruptcy loss Zr is strictly increasing in nA.I fnA ≥ 1
2,t h e n
Bank A’s bankruptcy probability is given by expression (A.28), and the total loss Zr given by
expression (A.29) is again strictly increasing in nA.
Taking both subcases of the case nA > ¯ nA together, we have shown that the regulator wants
to choose the nA as small as possible, hence nA =¯ nA, completing the proof that the regulator
will always implement ¯ nA if ¯ nA < 1
2.
Finally, we compare the welfare losses under risk-shifting (nA =¯ nA + ε, ε → 0) and under
cherry-picking (nA =¯ nA)i nt h i sr e g i o nt h a ta r eg i v e ni nE q . ( A . 3 1 )a n d( A . 3 2 ) . C o n s i d e rt h e
diﬀerence
Zc − Zr =
µ
−E
µ
1
2
+ k
¡
1 − 2nA¢¶¶
z −
Ã
1
2
¡
nA − E
¢¡
k − nA + 1
2
¢
(1 − nA)
−
E
¡
k − nA + 1
2
¢
1 − nA
2
!
z .
(A.34)
First, consider the upper end of the interval, where k and E are such that ¯ nA → 1
2. Then,
after substituting nA = 1
2 and simplifying, Eq. (A.34) yields:
Zc − Zr =
7
4
kzE −
1
2
zE −
1
2
kz < 0,
41which is negative since E<1
4. Finally, we consider the smallest possible value of ¯ nA with
cherry-picking, i.e. k → 1
2). Then
lim
k→1
2
(Zc − Zr)=
Ã
1
2
(1 − E) − E
µ
1
2
+
1
2
(1 − 2E)
¶
−
Ã
(1 − E)
2
−
E
¡1
2 − E + 1
2
¢
1 − E
2
!!
z
=
Ã
−E (1 − E)+
E (1 − E)
1 − E
2
!
z>0.
Hence, for k → 1
2, which implies ¯ nA → E, risk-shifting is always preferred. ¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .
Zi ≤ Zh is implied by the proof that nA =¯ nA is optimal in Region 3 of Proposition 3. Zi <Z u
in Region 1 can be shown as follows: Under Basel II, the regulator implements nA = E+k.T h e n ,
total bankruptcy costs are given by Zi(E+k)=1−k−2E
2 z. On the other hand, without investment
in an IRS (Basel I regulation), total bankruptcy costs are Zu = z
¡1
2 − E (1 + 2k)
¢
. Thus, we have
Zu − Zc(E + k)=2 kz
µ
1
4
− E
¶
> 0.( A . 3 5 )
To see that Zi ≶ Zu in Regions 2 and 3, we have to distinguish between the cases where 1
2 ≤
¯ nA <E+ k and where ¯ nA < 1
2. We start with the ﬁrst case where we know that the regulator
implements ¯ nA which ensures cherry-picking. We already know from Proposition 3 that total
bankruptcy costs are then Zi(¯ nA)=1
2z
¡
1 − ¯ nA − E
¢
, so that the we have
Zu − Zi(¯ nA)=z
µ
1
2
¯ nA − 2kE −
1
2
E
¶
.( A . 3 6 )
Now using the closed-form expression for ¯ nA from Eq. (A.22), we get
Zu − Zi(¯ nA)=
z
2
"
(2E +2 k − 1)
1
2 − E + k − 1
(2k − 1)
− E − 4kE
#
.( A . 3 7 )
We have then to show that both Zu >Z i(¯ nA) and Zu <Z i(¯ nA) can occur in this case.
Considering the minimum k = 1
2,w eg e t
Zu − Zi(¯ nA)=−
z
2
Ã
1
2 + E −
√
2E
(2k − 1)
+ E +2 E
!
< 0,
which shows that the uniform sector can be superior even if investment costs are neglected.
For the maximum k =1− E,w eg e t
42Zu − Zi(¯ nA)=
z
2
Ã
(2(1 − k)+2 k − 1)
1
2 − 2(1 − k)
(2k − 1)
− (1 + 4k)(1 − k)
!
=
zk
2
(4k − 3)
which is positive for any k ≥ 3
4, so that indeed both situations might occur for C =0 .W ec a n
also show (but omit it here) that Zu − Zi(¯ nA) is concave in k, so that there will be exactly one
point where Zu − Zi(¯ nA)=0 . In exactly the same manner (also omitted) it can be proven that
Zi ≶ Zu if ¯ nA < 1
2. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . Recall that all subsidies/taxes are assumed to be neutral from
a welfare point of view. Therefore, we can continue to compare only bankruptcy losses Z and
investment costs C as the only terms in the overall welfare that change between any two scenarios.
Part (i). If the preferences are aligned, Bank A invests if and only if this is optimal, so that
no subsidies are required. Underinvestment:A sC ≤ Zu −Zi, the regulator prefers Basel II. And
since Bank A invests if and only if Πi −Πu + s ≥ C, a minimum subsidy of s = C −(Πi − Πu) is
required. Overinvestment: In this case, the regulator prefers Basel I. Suppose that the regulator
chooses s<0 such that C + s>Πi − Πu. Then, Bank A will not apply for a license. If
C>Πh − Πu, the best Bank A can do is then not to invest, such that the regulator reaches the
desired outcome Basel I. If C ≤ Πh − Πu,h o w e v e r ,B a n kA prefers an investment with hiding
(which implies an allocation of 1
2 and risk-shifting) to not investing. Since this cannot be avoided
by taxes, and because Zi <Z h, the best reachable outcome is then to accommodate Basel II.
Part (ii). If the preferences are aligned or there is overinvestment and if Zu − Zi ≥ C,t h e
regulator prefers that the bank be certiﬁed as an IRB-bank since Zi <Z h.B a n kA will always
prefer to invest and hide since ¯ nA < 1
2 which implies Πh > Πi. Hence the regulator will oﬀer
suﬃcient subsidies s,a ss t a t e di nt h eP r o p o s i t i o n .I fZu−Zi <C , then preferences will be aligned,
and the bank will take the optimal decision of not investing without the regulator’s intervention. If
there is an underinvestment problem, then the same situation arises as in part (i): As C ≤ Zu−Zi
in this case, the regulator prefers Basel II. Bank A invests only if a subsidy of s ≥ C −(Πi − Πu)
is pledged, and the regulator will oﬀer this subsidy since there is no other cost involved. ¥
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